Crime, Broken Families, and Punishment

104 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2018 Last revised: 27 Jan 2021

See all articles by Emeline Bezin

Emeline Bezin

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Thierry Verdier

Paris School of Economics (PSE); Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Yves Zenou

Stockholm University; Monash University - Department of Economics; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: October 5, 2020

Abstract

We develop a two-period overlapping generations model in which both the structure of the family and the decision to commit crime are endogenous and the dynamics of moral norms of good conduct (honesty trait) is transmitted intergenerationally by families and peers. Having a father at home might be crucial to prevent susceptible boys from becoming criminals, as this facilitates the transmission of the honesty trait against criminal behavior. By destroying biparental families and putting fathers in prison, we show that more intense crime repression can backfire at the local level because it increases the possibility that criminals' sons become criminals themselves. Consistent with sociological disorganization theories of crime, the model also explains the emergence and persistence of urban ghettos characterized by a large proportion of broken families, high crime rates, and high levels of peer socialization, which reinforce criminal activities. Finally, we discuss the efficiency of segregation, family and education policies in terms of long-term crime rates.

Keywords: Crime, Social Interactions, Cultural Transmission, Social Disorganization Theory, Broken Families, Urban Ghettos, Segregation

JEL Classification: K42, J15, Z13

Suggested Citation

Bezin, Emeline and Verdier, Thierry and Zenou, Yves and Zenou, Yves, Crime, Broken Families, and Punishment (October 5, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3200773 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3200773

Emeline Bezin

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Thierry Verdier

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014
France

Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) - Department of Economics ( email )

Rua Marques de Sao Vicente, 225/206F
Rio de Janeiro, RJ 22453
Brazil

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Yves Zenou (Contact Author)

Monash University - Department of Economics ( email )

Australia

Stockholm University ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) ( email )

P.O. Box 5501
S-114 85 Stockholm
Sweden

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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