The Trouble With Groves: Revisiting the Classical Pure Public Good Problem

44 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2018

Date Written: June 22, 2018

Abstract

We discuss the problem of procuring a single pure public good under the assumption that preferences are quasilinear. We concentrate on the class of strategy-proof, anonymous and feasible mechanisms that are not dominated by another strategy-proof, anonymous and feasible mechanism. We identify reasonable mechanisms within this class. Our endeavor is motivated by the fact that Groves mechanisms, with the exception of the Pivotal mechanism, are typically dominated.

Keywords: Pure Public Good; Strategy-Proof Mechanisms; Decision Efficiency; Groves Mechanisms; Undominated Mechanisms

JEL Classification: D71; D82

Suggested Citation

Efthymios, Athanasiou and Valletta, Giacomo, The Trouble With Groves: Revisiting the Classical Pure Public Good Problem (June 22, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3200921 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3200921

Athanasiou Efthymios (Contact Author)

New Economic School ( email )

100A Novaya Street
Moscow, Skolkovo 143026
Russia

Giacomo Valletta

EDHEC Business School ( email )

58 rue du Port
Lille, 59046
France

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