Studying Judicial Coalitions in a Hostile Environment: A Modified Pritchett Approach
11 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2018
Date Written: June 22, 2018
Abstract
The paper adapts the methodology for analyzing judicial behavior through dissenting coalitions. Using data from the Chilean Supreme Court between 2008 and 2012, we argue that the composition of Latin-American courts is less stable that its counterparts in the US or Europe, whereas the judicial workload is significantly higher and the frequency of split decisions significantly lower. In order to deal with these three idiosyncratic features, we focus on a single pair of justices and build several response variables that follow Pritchett’s traditional approach. In summary, the results on the Chilean Supreme Court show a significant correlation between the probability of finding a split decision and different interactions with a well-defined pair of justices (i.e. Araneda and Brito). Moreover, during the discussion of a previous paper presenting preliminary findings, former members of the Supreme Court highlighted that the origin of the dispute between this pair of justices arose during human-right cases in which the victims of political persecution during Augusto Pinochet’s regime were claiming damages against the State (Huneeus 2010). Interestingly enough, the subject matter and type of recourse related with those particular cases are also significant indicator for the probability of finding a split decision. From these perspective, we believe our research contributes to deepening the methodology for understanding judicial decision-making, particularly in the Latin-American context.
Keywords: Chilean Supreme Court, Judicial behavior, Judicial decision-making, Formation of coalitions, Empirical legal research
JEL Classification: C21, K40, Z18
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