The Effect of the Risk Corridors Program on Marketplace Premiums and Participation*

49 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2018

See all articles by Daniel W. Sacks

Daniel W. Sacks

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Khoa Vu

University of Minnesota - St. Paul - Department of Applied Economics

Tsan-Yao Huang

University of Minnesota - Minneapolis

Pinar Karaca-Mandic

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - School of Public Health

Date Written: April 30, 2018

Abstract

We investigate the effect of the Risk Corridors (RC) program on premiums and insurer participation in the Affordable Care Act (ACA)’s Health Insurance Marketplaces. The RC program, which was defunded ahead of coverage year 2016, and ended in 2017, is a risk sharing mechanism: it makes payments to insurers whose costs are high relative to their revenue, and collects payments from insurers whose costs are relatively low. We show theoretically that the RC program creates strong incentives to lower premiums for some insurers. Empirically, we find that insurers who claimed RC payments in 2015, before defunding, had greater premium increases in 2017, after the program ended. Insurance markets in which more insurers made RC claims experienced larger premium increases after the program ended, reflecting equilibrium effects. We do not find robust evidence that insurers with larger RC claims in 2015 were less likely to participate in the ACA Marketplaces in 2016 and 2017. Overall we find that the end of the RC program significantly contributed to premium growth.

Suggested Citation

Sacks, Daniel W. and Vu, Khoa and Huang, Tsan-Yao and Karaca-Mandic, Pinar, The Effect of the Risk Corridors Program on Marketplace Premiums and Participation* (April 30, 2018). Kelley School of Business Research Paper No. 18-57, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3201686 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3201686

Daniel W. Sacks

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Khoa Vu

University of Minnesota - St. Paul - Department of Applied Economics ( email )

1994 Bufford Avenue
Saint Paul, MN 55108
United States

Tsan-Yao Huang

University of Minnesota - Minneapolis

110 Wulling Hall, 86 Pleasant St, S.E.
308 Harvard Street SE
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

Pinar Karaca-Mandic (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - School of Public Health ( email )

15-223 Phillips-Wangensteen Building
Box 729, 420 Delaware Street SE
Minneapolis, MN 55455-0392
United States

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