Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and the Home Bias

48 Pages Posted: 30 Jul 2002

See all articles by Magnus Dahlquist

Magnus Dahlquist

Stockholm School of Economics; Swedish House of Finance

Lee Pinkowitz

Georgetown University - Department of Finance

René M. Stulz

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Rohan Williamson

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business

Date Written: June 2002

Abstract

If investors are poorly protected, it is optimal for firms to be closely held because selling shares to minority shareholders is otherwise too expensive. Empirically, most firms in countries with poor investor protection are closely held so that investors cannot hold the market portfolio. We show that the prevalence of closely held firms in countries with poor investor protection explains part of the home bias of U.S. investors. We construct an estimate of the world portfolio of shares available to investors who are not controlling shareholders (the world float portfolio). The world float portfolio differs sharply from the world market portfolio. In regressions explaining the portfolio weights of U.S. investors, the world float portfolio has a positive significant coefficient but the world market portfolio has no additional explanatory power. This result holds when we control for country characteristics. An analysis of foreign investor holdings at the firm level for Sweden confirms the importance of the float portfolio as a determinant of these holdings.

Suggested Citation

Dahlquist, Magnus and Pinkowitz, Lee Foster and Stulz, Rene M. and Williamson, Rohan G., Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and the Home Bias (June 2002). Tuck-JQFA Contemporary Corporate Governance Issues II Conference. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=320222 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.320222

Magnus Dahlquist

Stockholm School of Economics ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
Stockholm, SE-111 60
Sweden

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

Lee Foster Pinkowitz

Georgetown University - Department of Finance ( email )

3700 O Street, NW
Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-2689 (Phone)
202-687-4031 (Fax)

Rene M. Stulz (Contact Author)

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance ( email )

2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/faculty/stulz

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Rohan G. Williamson

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business ( email )

3700 O Street, NW
Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-2284 (Phone)
202-687-4031 (Fax)

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