Integration of Primary and Resale Platforms
Zou, Tianxin and Baojun Jiang. "Integration of Primary and Resale Platforms." Journal of Marketing Research, Forthcoming
44 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2018 Last revised: 18 Mar 2020
Date Written: March 13, 2020
Consumers can buy concert tickets from primary platforms (e.g., Ticketmaster) or from consumer-to-consumer resale platforms (e.g., StubHub). Recently, Ticketmaster has entered and been trying to control the resale market by prohibiting consumers from reselling on competing resale platforms. Several states in the U.S. have passed or are discussing laws requiring tickets to be transferrable on any resale sites, worrying that platform integration—Ticketmaster controlling both the primary and the resale platforms—will increase ticket service fees and harm musicians and consumers. This paper establishes a game-theoretic framework and shows that the opposite can happen: platform integration can lower the service fees in both markets, alleviating double marginalization in the primary market and benefiting the musician and consumers. Moreover, with platform integration, the presence of a small number of scalpers can counterintuitively reduce the ticket price and benefit the musicians and consumers. Additionally, platform competition in the resale market may harm consumers. This paper further shows that these insights apply in other markets, e.g., used-good or peer-to-peer product-sharing markets, and provides suggestive empirical support for the theoretical results.
Keywords: platform, channel, event ticket, pricing, retail, resale, consumer-to-consumer, performing arts
JEL Classification: L41, D43, M38
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation