Lobbying for Government Appropriations

74 Pages Posted: 21 Jul 2018 Last revised: 30 Aug 2023

See all articles by Christian Cox

Christian Cox

University of Arizona - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 16, 2022

Abstract

This article investigates the effect of lobbying on government contract allocation. I consider how lobbying affects both total contract spending and the distribution of contracts between firms. I solve a novel contest model which incorporates these two effects, and then I structurally estimate it using a panel of federal contractors. The results suggest that lobbying increases contract spending by $8.837 billion (3.22%) per year. However, its effects on the observed contract distribution and firm revenues are relatively small. Lastly, I find that increasing competition in procurement generally results in less lobbying.

Suggested Citation

Cox, Christian, Lobbying for Government Appropriations (June 16, 2022). RAND Journal of Economics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3203661 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3203661

Christian Cox (Contact Author)

University of Arizona - Department of Economics ( email )

McClelland Hall
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States

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