The Accountability and Corporate Social Responsibility of Multinational Corporations for Transgressions in Host States Through International Investment Law

16 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2018

Date Written: June 15, 2018

Abstract

Traditionally, International Investment Agreements (IIAs) do not include obligations for investors concerning human rights, international labour standards and environmental protection standards owed to a host state. IIAs were designed to protect and promote foreign investors and their investments. However, with the inclusion of broader non-economic objectives, i.e. sustainable development objectives, in a new generation of IIAs, the content of investment treaties in terms of the rights and obligations of states and investors has been changing. There has been a shift towards recognizing the responsibility and accountability of investors, which is observable in a number of recent IIAs and in several decisions by investment tribunals. This article analyses the legal implications of the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) provisions found in a number of IIAs in terms of investor responsibility and accountability. Furthermore, the article discusses the obligations of investors under human rights treaties and the role of the investor’s conduct in deciding on substantive investment protection guarantees, such as the fair and equitable treatment (FET) of investors.

Keywords: international investment law, corporate social responsibility (CSR), International Investment Agreements (IIAs), fair and equitable treatment (FET), foreign investors, human rights

Suggested Citation

Levashova, Yulia, The Accountability and Corporate Social Responsibility of Multinational Corporations for Transgressions in Host States Through International Investment Law (June 15, 2018). Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 40-55, 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3204456

Yulia Levashova (Contact Author)

Utrecht University ( email )

Vredenburg 138
Utrecht, 3511 BG
Netherlands

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
58
Abstract Views
173
rank
357,751
PlumX Metrics