Human Rights and Wrongs: Biological Skepticism Towards Human Rights

68 Pages Posted: 27 Jul 2018  

Ammar Younas

University of Saint Joseph (Beirut), Institute of Political Science, Students

Date Written: June 28, 2018

Abstract

This thesis is an attempt to provide an adequate theoretical framework to understand the biological basis of human rights. We argue that the skepticism about human rights is increasing especially among the most rational, innovative and productive community of intellectuals belonging to the applied sciences. By using examples of embryonic stem cell research, humanoid robotics and artificial intelligence, a clash between applied scientists and legal scientists cum human rights activists has been highlighted. International human rights regimes notably UN bodies are writing declaration after declaration related to issues purely of biological nature such as bioethics, human genome, genetic engineering and human cloning. Because of these declarations, applied scientists fed up of human rights and can justifiably reject them as a whole considering them alien to scientific culture and hence saying that they are unable to find local normative validity of human rights inside the scientific community. After an extensive literature review, this thesis concludes that advances in applied sciences proven by empirical evidences should not be restricted by normative theories and philosophies of the social scientists who often take part in drafting of the legal documents such as UN Declarations. Whereas biology can provide a framework of cooperation for social and applied scientists.

Keywords: Human Rights, Biology, Skepticism

Suggested Citation

Younas, Ammar, Human Rights and Wrongs: Biological Skepticism Towards Human Rights (June 28, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3205098 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3205098

Ammar Younas (Contact Author)

University of Saint Joseph (Beirut), Institute of Political Science, Students ( email )

Beirut
Lebanon

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