The Alternative Way to Deal with the Cyprus Co-Op Bank 'Socialising the Losses and Privatising the Gains – Part 3'

11 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2018

See all articles by Savvakis C. Savvides

Savvakis C. Savvides

Queen's University - John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy

Date Written: June 29, 2018

Abstract

The author has written two articles on the subject of “the Deal” sought and negotiated by the Government for privatising the ailing Co-Op Bank in Cyprus. In this paper he continues with “Socialising the losses and privatising the gains - Part 3” which provides an alternative proposal than the one that the Government arrived at with Hellenic Bank. It makes the argument that the concessions made in desperation to the Hellenic Bank (which was the only bidder) can be employed with less risk for the people and more usefully for the economy to create a new financing institution which would undertake the much needed task of reconstructing and developing the economy on a sound and solid footing. The deal reached with the Hellenic Bank and put forward for Parliamentary approval is fraught with many risks and comes at very high costs for the Cypriot tax payer. There is another, a better way to diffuse the Co-Op conundrum and turn it into a positive instrument for sustainable development. But we begin with Part 2 which is presented again below by the subtitle of Collateral Damage in order to put Part 3 on the Alternative way into context.

Keywords: repayment capability, project evaluation, corporate lending, credit risk

JEL Classification: D61, G17, G21, G32, G33, H43

Suggested Citation

Savvides, Savvakis C., The Alternative Way to Deal with the Cyprus Co-Op Bank 'Socialising the Losses and Privatising the Gains – Part 3' (June 29, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3205425 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3205425

Savvakis C. Savvides (Contact Author)

Queen's University - John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy ( email )

Canada

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