Medical Malpractice Litigation and the Market for Representation: Evidence from Indiana

28 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2018 Last revised: 25 Oct 2018

See all articles by David A. Hyman

David A. Hyman

Georgetown University Law Center

Jing Liu

East China University of Political Science and Law

Bernard S. Black

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: October 22, 2018

Abstract

How concentrated is the market for representation in medical malpractice (med mal) cases, whether for plaintiffs or defendants? How often do plaintiffs proceed pro se, and with what results? Do successful lawyers start off with better cases to begin with or do they add more value to the cases – or both? What law school did elite practitioners attend – and where are they located? Building on earlier work involving Illinois, we use a dataset of every med mal case filed in Indiana during 1976-2014 to identify the 2,717 plaintiff-side firms and 781 defense-side firms that handle these cases. We stratify these firms into three tiers and compare case outcomes with different tier match-ups. Finally, we use propensity score weighting to place some boundaries on the effect of representation on the chances of prevailing and on total recovery.

Keywords: pro se, represented, market for representation

Suggested Citation

Hyman, David A. and Liu, Jing and Black, Bernard S., Medical Malpractice Litigation and the Market for Representation: Evidence from Indiana (October 22, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3205704 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3205704

David A. Hyman (Contact Author)

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States

Jing Liu

East China University of Political Science and Law

Shanghai, Shanghai
China

Bernard S. Black

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-503-2784 (Phone)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-5049 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Brussels
Belgium

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