Managing Cartels through Patent Pools

31 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2018  

Weimin Wu

University of Iowa, College of Law

Date Written: June 30, 2018

Abstract

Patent pools can serve many purposes. Some of them are procompetitive while others anticompetitive. This article addresses one aspect of patent pools that has not received much attention—patent pool’s role in stabilizing a cartel of downstream producers. The article first reviews the problem of cartel cheating, which threats the stability of cartels. Any potential mechanisms that cartels can use to increase stability face three main challenges: (1) the cost of management, (2) agency costs, and (3) the requirement of secrecy. Our analysis shows that a vertically-related firm is an ideal candidate to manage a cartel. Our analysis has important implications for our understanding of patent pools. Because a patent pool is in a vertical relationship with multiple downstream producers, they can use a patent pool as a mechanism to facilitate collusion. The article argues that the vertical licensor-licensee relationship gives a patent pool better chances to evade antitrust scrutiny and more latitude in monitoring downstream producers’ performances. It also argues that aggregation of patents in a patent pool would make it more effective in punishing cartel cheating. The article’s main finding that a patent pool is uniquely suited to manage a downstream cartel is a reminder that an overly permissive view of patent pools can invite anticompetitive hazards.

Keywords: patent pool,cartel, cartel manager, agency cost, vertical relationship

JEL Classification: K21, L41, O34

Suggested Citation

Wu, Weimin, Managing Cartels through Patent Pools (June 30, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3205794 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3205794

Weimin Wu (Contact Author)

University of Iowa, College of Law ( email )

Iowa City, IA
United States

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