Ordinally Symmetric Games

Operations Research Letters, Forthcoming

9 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2018 Last revised: 25 Jan 2019

See all articles by Zhigang Cao

Zhigang Cao

Beijing Jiaotong University - School of Economics and Management

Xiaoguang Yang

Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)

Date Written: July 2, 2018

Abstract

We extend the notion of an ordinally symmetric game of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) from two to n players. We prove that each ordinally symmetric game with two strategies is an ordinal potential game and thus possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, generalizing a result of Hofbauer and Sorger (2002) on symmetric games.

Keywords: Symmetric Games, Ordinally Symmetric Games, Potential Games

JEL Classification: C72

Suggested Citation

Cao, Zhigang and Yang, Xiaoguang, Ordinally Symmetric Games (July 2, 2018). Operations Research Letters, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3206379 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3206379

Zhigang Cao (Contact Author)

Beijing Jiaotong University - School of Economics and Management ( email )

China

Xiaoguang Yang

Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) ( email )

52 Sanlihe Rd.
Datun Road, Anwai
Beijing, Xicheng District 100864
China

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
43
Abstract Views
292
PlumX Metrics