Indirect Contacts in Hiring: The Economics Job Market

32 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2018 Last revised: 24 Feb 2021

See all articles by Michael E. Rose

Michael E. Rose

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Suraj Shekhar

Ashoka University

Date Written: June 29, 2018

Abstract

Using two identification strategies, we demonstrate a positive relationship between the connectedness of a PhD adviser (in the coauthor network) and the placement of her student. In method one, identification is achieved by using changes in the centrality of the adviser’s coauthors in the year of student placement as an exogenous shock to the adviser’s centrality. Our second strategy uses the death of faculty members as an exogenous shock to show that the probability of a student being placed at a particular university reduces when the ‘social distance’ between her adviser and that university increases due to the death.

Keywords: Placement, academic labor market, social network, referrals

JEL Classification: A11, D83, J44, J64

Suggested Citation

Rose, Michael and Shekhar, Suraj, Indirect Contacts in Hiring: The Economics Job Market (June 29, 2018). Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 18-12, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3206474

Michael Rose (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.ip.mpg.de/en/persons/rose-michael.html

Suraj Shekhar

Ashoka University ( email )

Ashoka University
Rajiv Gandhi Education City
Sonipat, 131029
India

HOME PAGE: http://surajshekhar.com/

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