Algorithmic Pricing: What Implications for Competition Policy?

19 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2018

See all articles by Emilio Calvano

Emilio Calvano

University of Bologna - Department of Economics; University of Toulouse 1 - Department of Economics; CSEF - Center for Studies in Economics and Finance

Giacomo Calzolari

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Bologna

Vincenzo Denicolò

University of Bologna

Sergio Pastorello

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 7, 2018

Abstract

Pricing decisions are increasingly in the “hands” of artificial algorithms. Scholars and competition authorities have voiced concerns that those algorithms are capable of sustaining collusive outcomes more effectively than human decision makers. If this is so, then our traditional policy tools for fighting collusion may have to be reconsidered. We discuss these issues by critically surveying the relevant law, economics and computer science literatures.

Keywords: Algorithmic Pricing, Competition Policy, Artifical Intellicence, Machine Learning, Collusion

JEL Classification: D42, D82, L42

Suggested Citation

Calvano, Emilio and Calzolari, Giacomo and Denicolo, Vincenzo and Pastorello, Sergio, Algorithmic Pricing: What Implications for Competition Policy? (July 7, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3209781 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3209781

Emilio Calvano

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Bologna
Italy

University of Toulouse 1 - Department of Economics ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

CSEF - Center for Studies in Economics and Finance ( email )

Via Cintia
Complesso Monte S. Angelo
Naples, Naples 80126
Italy

Giacomo Calzolari (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO) ( email )

Villa la Fonte
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San Domenico di Fiesole, Florence 50014
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
I-40126 Bologna
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/giacomo-calzolari

Vincenzo Denicolo

University of Bologna ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

Sergio Pastorello

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Saragozza, 8
Bologna, 40125
Italy
+39 051 2098144 (Phone)
+39 051 2098040 (Fax)

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