Biased Experts, Majority Rule, and the Optimal Composition of Committee

33 Pages Posted: 30 Jul 2018 Last revised: 29 Aug 2018

See all articles by Alvaro Name Correa

Alvaro Name Correa

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Huseyin Yildirim

Duke University - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 12, 2018

Abstract

A committee of experts votes between a multi-attribute alternative and status quo. Each expert is a biased specialist who can privately evaluate only one attribute and puts more weight on it. We study whether a social-minded principal would compose the committee of more or less biased experts. We find that due to strategic voting, her optimal composition depends non-monotonically on the majority rule. The composition is, however, less crucial if experts can be uninformed. Nonetheless, the principal may prefer to have some uninformed experts, perhaps by rushing the vote, when the committee is large, or its composition is suboptimal.

Keywords: bias, partisanship, majority rule, committee

JEL Classification: C7, D7

Suggested Citation

Name Correa, Alvaro and Yildirim, Huseyin, Biased Experts, Majority Rule, and the Optimal Composition of Committee (June 12, 2018). Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 268. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3212051 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3212051

Alvaro Name Correa

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ( email )

CL. de Madrid 126
Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

Huseyin Yildirim (Contact Author)

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
919-660-1805 (Phone)
919-684-8974 (Fax)

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