Selling Strategic Information in Digital Competitive Markets

48 Pages Posted: 21 Jul 2018

See all articles by David Bounie

David Bounie

Telecom ParisTech; Télécom Paris

Antoine Dubus

ETH Zürich

Patrick Waelbroeck

Télécom Paris

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 06, 2018

Abstract

This paper investigates the strategies of a data broker in selling information to one or to two competing firms that can price-discriminate consumers. The data broker can strategically choose any segment of the consumer demand (information structure) to sell to firms that implement third-degree price-discrimination. We show that the equilibrium profits of the data broker are maximized when (1) information identifies the consumers with the highest willingness to pay; (2) consumers with a low willingness to pay remain unidentified; (3) the data broker sells two symmetrical information structures. The data broker therefore strategically sells partial information on consumers in order to soften competition between firms. Extending the baseline model, we prove that these results hold under first-degree price-discrimination.

Keywords: data broker, information structure, price-discrimination

JEL Classification: D400, D800, L500, D430

Suggested Citation

Bounie, David and Bounie, David and Dubus, Antoine and Waelbroeck, Patrick, Selling Strategic Information in Digital Competitive Markets (June 06, 2018). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 7078, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3212574 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3212574

David Bounie

Telecom ParisTech ( email )

46, rue Barrault
Paris Cedex 13, F-75634
France
+33145817332 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://ses.telecom-paristech.fr/bounie/

Télécom Paris ( email )

19 Place Marguerite Perey
Palaiseau, 91120
France

Antoine Dubus

ETH Zürich ( email )

LEE G104
Leonhardstrasse 21
Zurich
Switzerland

Patrick Waelbroeck (Contact Author)

Télécom Paris ( email )

19 Place Marguerite Perey
Palaiseau, 91120
France

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