Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion

VATT Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 109

49 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2018

See all articles by Konstantinos Matakos

Konstantinos Matakos

King’s College London - Department of Political Economy; Harvard University - Department of Government

Riikka Savolainen

Newcastle University

Orestis Troumpounis

Università di Padova; Lancaster University - Department of Economics

Janne Tukiainen

VATT Institute for Economic Research; University of Turku - Turku School of Business - Department of Economics

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus

Date Written: July 12, 2018

Abstract

We study parties' optimal ideological cohesion across electoral rules, when the following trade-off is present: A more heterogenous set of candidates is electorally appealing (catch-all party), yet, it serves policy-related goals less efficiently. When the rule becomes more disproportional, thus inducing a more favorable seat allocation for the winner, the first effect is amplified, incentivizing parties to be less cohesive. We provide empirical support using a unique data-set that records candidates' ideological positions in Finnish municipal elections. Exploiting an exogenous change of electoral rule disproportionality at different population thresholds, we identify the causal effect of electoral rules on parties' cohesion.

Keywords: electoral systems, ideological heterogeneity, party cohesion, policymotivated parties, proportional representation, regression discontinuity design

JEL Classification: C21, C72, D02, D72

Suggested Citation

Matakos, Konstantinos and Savolainen, Riikka and Troumpounis, Orestis and Tukiainen, Janne and Tukiainen, Janne and Xefteris, Dimitrios, Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion (July 12, 2018). VATT Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 109, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3212638 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3212638

Konstantinos Matakos

King’s College London - Department of Political Economy ( email )

Bush House NE
London, London WC2B 4BG
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/kostasmatakos/

Harvard University - Department of Government ( email )

1737 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Riikka Savolainen

Newcastle University ( email )

5 Barrack Road
Newcastle, Tyne and Wear NE1 4SE
United Kingdom

Orestis Troumpounis

Università di Padova ( email )

Lancaster University - Department of Economics ( email )

Lancaster LA1 4YX, LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

Janne Tukiainen (Contact Author)

VATT Institute for Economic Research ( email )

Arkadiankatu 7
P.O Box 1279
Helsinki, FIN-00101
Finland

University of Turku - Turku School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

Rehtorinpellonkatu 3
Turku, 20014
Finland

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

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