Friend-Based Ranking

49 Pages Posted: 4 Aug 2018 Last revised: 20 Oct 2018

See all articles by Francis Bloch

Francis Bloch

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Matthew Olckers

Paris School of Economics (PSE); Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

Date Written: October 17, 2018

Abstract

We analyze the design of a mechanism to extract ordinal information disseminated in a social network. We show that friend-based ranking — the report by agents on the characteristics of their neighbors — is a necessary condition for ex post incentive-compatible and efficient mechanism design. We characterize the windmill network as the sparsest social network for which the planner can construct a complete ranking. When complete rankings cannot be achieved, ex post incentive-compatible and efficient mechanisms arise when social networks are bipartite or composed of triangles. We illustrate these findings using real social networks in India and Indonesia.

Keywords: social networks, mechanism design, peer ranking, targeting

JEL Classification: D85, D82, O12, D71

Suggested Citation

Bloch, Francis and Olckers, Matthew, Friend-Based Ranking (October 17, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213311 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3213311

Francis Bloch

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Matthew Olckers (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.matthewolckers.com

Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

106-112 boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris 13e Arrondissement, 75013
France

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