Not Available for Download

Conflicting Social Motives in Negotiating Groups

Posted: 6 Aug 2002  

Laurie R. Weingart

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business

Jeanne M. Brett

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Mara Olekalns

Melbourne Business School

Abstract

Negotiating groups composed of 4 members with different social motives were examined to determine the impact of social motive composition on negotiation behavior. Theories of negotiation, experimental games, and group altruism were used to develop hypotheses regarding how social motive composition influences negotiation strategies and how negotiation strategies change over time. 36 groups in 5 composition conditions (all cooperatives; 3 cooperatives/1 individualist; 2 cooperators/2 individualists; 1 cooperator/3 individualists; all individualists) were coded for negotiation behavior. Results showed that social motive composition influenced use of negotiation strategies. Supporting expectations derived from the experimental games literature, groups that included one or more individualistic members used relatively more distributive strategies than did groups composed of all cooperative members. Supporting negotiation theory, the more cooperative members in the group, the more integrative information was exchanged. Use of negotiation strategies also changed over time. Distributive strategies peaked at the beginning of the negotiation and gradually decreased. Integrative strategies increased significantly at the midpoint of the group meeting. Groups composed of equal numbers of cooperatives and individualists appeared to be the least likely to experience this transition.

Suggested Citation

Weingart, Laurie R. and Brett, Jeanne M. and Olekalns, Mara, Conflicting Social Motives in Negotiating Groups. AoM Conflict Management Division 2002 Mtgs. No. 12097. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=321385 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.321385

Laurie R. Weingart (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )

236A Posner Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
412-268-7585 (Phone)
412-268-6920 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gsia.cmu.edu/andrew/weingart

Jeanne M. Brett

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-8075 (Phone)
847-491-8896 (Fax)

Mara Olekalns

Melbourne Business School ( email )

200 Leicester Street
Carlton, Victoria 3053 3186
Australia
+61 3 9349 8146 (Phone)
+61 3 9349 8133 (Fax)

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
3,574