All Mixed Strategy Equilibria are Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions

14 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2002

See all articles by David McAdams

David McAdams

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)

Date Written: August 2002

Abstract

Every mixed strategy equilibrium is outcome equivalent to a monotone pure strategy equilibrium in asymmetric first-price auctions in which n bidders have affiliated, one-dimensional, atomless types and interdependent values.

Keywords: Asymmetric First-price Auctions, Asymmetric Bidders, Mixed Strategy Equilibrium

Suggested Citation

McAdams, David, All Mixed Strategy Equilibria are Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions (August 2002). MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4256-02. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=321425

David McAdams (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA) ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States
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