Tax Compliance and Enforcement

100 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2018

See all articles by Joel B. Slemrod

Joel B. Slemrod

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: July 2018

Abstract

This paper reviews recent economic research in tax compliance and enforcement. After briefly laying out the economics of tax evasion, it focuses on recent empirical contributions. It first discusses what methodologies and data have facilitated these contributions, and then presents critical summaries of what has been learned. It discusses a promising new development, the analysis of randomized controlled trials mostly delivered via letters from the tax authority, and then reviews recent research using various methods about the impact of the principal enforcement tax policy instruments: audits, information reporting, and remittance regimes. I also explore several understudied issues worthy of more research attention. The paper closes by outlining a normative framework based on the behavioral response elasticities now being credibly estimated that allows one to assess whether a given enforcement intervention is worth doing.

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Suggested Citation

Slemrod, Joel B., Tax Compliance and Enforcement (July 2018). NBER Working Paper No. w24799. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3214342

Joel B. Slemrod (Contact Author)

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

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