From Self-Prediction to Self-Defeat: The Effect of Expecting a Competitive Opponent on Negotiator Predictions, Behaviors, and Outcomes

30 Pages Posted: 16 Sep 2002

See all articles by Kristina A. Diekmann

Kristina A. Diekmann

University of Utah - Department of Management

Ann E. Tenbrunsel

University of Notre Dame - Department of Management & Administration Sciences

Adam D. Galinsky

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Management

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of negotiators' expectations of their opponents' competitiveness on negotiators' predictions of their own behavior, their actual behaviors, and their negotiated outcomes. Study 1 examined negotiators' predictions of how they would react when faced with a very competitive versus a not competitive opponent and found that negotiators believed they would become more competitive, less cooperative, and less likely to make concessions when negotiating with a very competitive opponent. Studies 2 and 3 examined actual behaviors during a negotiation and found that negotiators who expected very competitive opponents actually became less competitive, as evidenced by setting lower, less aggressive reservation prices and agreeing to lower negotiated outcomes. Study 3 further revealed that own reservation price mediated the relationship between competitive expectations and negotiated outcomes. Finally, Study 4 examined more naturally occurring expectations in a negotiation and found that expectations of greater competitiveness were associated with lower negotiated outcomes.

Keywords: Expectations, negotiations, self-defeating

Suggested Citation

Diekmann, Kristina A. and Tenbrunsel, Ann E. and Galinsky, Adam D., From Self-Prediction to Self-Defeat: The Effect of Expecting a Competitive Opponent on Negotiator Predictions, Behaviors, and Outcomes. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=321447 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.321447

Kristina A. Diekmann (Contact Author)

University of Utah - Department of Management ( email )

1645 E Campus Center Dr
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States
801-581-8524 (Phone)
801-581-7214 (Fax)

Ann E. Tenbrunsel

University of Notre Dame - Department of Management & Administration Sciences ( email )

Notre Dame, IN 46556-0399
United States
219-631-7402 (Phone)

Adam D. Galinsky

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Management ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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