Revisiting the Public Utility - Foreword

10 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2018 Last revised: 18 Oct 2018

See all articles by Jim Rossi

Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt University - Law School

Morgan Ricks

Vanderbilt University - Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: July 17, 2018

Abstract

This foreword introduces "Revisiting the Public Utility," a series of essays published in a special issue of Yale Journal on Regulation. We cluster the contributions to this issue around public utility regulation’s core rationales and its scope, its implications for innovation and industry stability, and its evolving approach to price regulation. The scholarship represented in this issue challenges the notion that public utility ideas are obsolete or irrelevant to modern issues in economic regulation. It questions whether public utility regulation has fallen short of its goals, and shows that there are some good reasons to question many embedded regulatory practices. At the same time, the endeavor of revisiting the public utility demonstrates how public utility ideas remain foundational to many of modern regulatory law's tasks and aspirations.

Keywords: Public Utility, Monopolies, Economic Regulation, Price Regulation, Innovation, Universal Service, Net Neutrality

Suggested Citation

Rossi, Jim and Ricks, Morgan, Revisiting the Public Utility - Foreword (July 17, 2018). Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 35, 2018, Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 18-48, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3215297

Jim Rossi (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Ave S
Nashville, TN 37203-5724
United States
6153436620 (Phone)

Morgan Ricks

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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