Nudging Civil Justice: Examining Voluntary and Mandatory Court Mediation User Experience in Twelve Regions

Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 19, Issue 2, pp. 269-288, 2018

20 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2018

See all articles by Shahla F. Ali

Shahla F. Ali

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law

Date Written: February 18, 2018

Abstract

Nudge theory suggests that positive reinforcement to encourage compliance is at least as effective, if not more effective, than traditional directions issued through legislation. This Article tests nudge theory in the context of court mediation reform by examining whether, and if so how, light nudges encouraging voluntary mediation have a differential effect on civil justice outcomes as compared with more robust nudges through mandated mediation processes. A statistical analysis of 2016–2017 civil justice indicators in twelve regions suggests light nudges, (voluntary court mediation programs, or (self-directed resolution), on average associated with higher overall jurisdictional scores for efficiency and non-discrimination. In comparison, robust nudges, (court-mandated mediation processes) show no significant difference in relation to the quality of civil justice, effective enforcement, accessibility and affordability, and impartiality, and effectiveness between voluntary and mandatory mediation systems in the regions examined.

Keywords: Nudge Theory, Comparative Dispute Resolution, Court Mediation, Civil Justice Reform

Suggested Citation

Ali, Shahla F., Nudging Civil Justice: Examining Voluntary and Mandatory Court Mediation User Experience in Twelve Regions (February 18, 2018). Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 19, Issue 2, pp. 269-288, 2018 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3216266

Shahla F. Ali (Contact Author)

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law ( email )

Chung Yu Tung Tower (Law), Centennial Campus
Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
(852) 3917 2931 (Phone)
(852) 2559-3543 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.hku.hk/law/faculty/staff/ali_shahla.html

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