When Sharing Platforms Fix Sellers' Prices

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement (OUP), Forthcoming

Lund LawComp WP No. 1/2018

27 Pages Posted: 8 Aug 2018

See all articles by Julian Nowag

Julian Nowag

Lund University - Faculty of Law; Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy

Date Written: February 2, 2018

Abstract

While price-fixing on platforms can attract severe enforcement action, as shown by the Amazon poster case, a more nuanced picture emerges regarding the fixing of prices for sellers by sharing economy platforms. This paper explores possible antitrust responses to such centralised platform-driven price-fixing. The paper, first, provides an introduction to the sharing economy and pricing models on such platforms. Then, it investigates the extent to which established case law and frameworks applied in competition law fit with the incentive structure and the operation of such platforms. In the final section, the paper highlights key questions from a competition law and from a policy perspective. It highlights how such practices defy traditional antitrust thinking and give rise to new policy and legal challenges.

Keywords: platforms, sharing economy, price-fixing, labour, employee, agency, hub-and- spoke, enforcement

JEL Classification: K00, K20, K21, K31, K42, L11, L14, L22, L23, L24, L41, L42

Suggested Citation

Nowag, Julian, When Sharing Platforms Fix Sellers' Prices (February 2, 2018). Journal of Antitrust Enforcement (OUP), Forthcoming , Lund LawComp WP No. 1/2018 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3217193 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3217193

Julian Nowag (Contact Author)

Lund University - Faculty of Law ( email )

Lilla Gråbrödersgatan 4
Lund, 222 22
Sweden

Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy ( email )

St Cross Building
St Cross Road Oxford
Oxford, OX1 3UL
United Kingdom

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