Land Rights, Farmer Investment Incentives, and Agricultural Production in China

Dept. of Agricultural & Resource Econ. Univ. of California, Davis Working Paper No. 00-024

43 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2002

See all articles by Guo Li

Guo Li

World Bank - Rural Development (EASRD)

Scott Rozelle

University of California, Davis - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Jikun Huang

Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)

Date Written: December 2000

Abstract

The overall goal of our paper is to estimate the impact of China's land rights on farm investment incentives and agricultural production. To meet the goal, the paper pursues three specific objectives. First, the paper briefly reviews the various linkages between land rights and investment incentives. Next, we demonstrate how land use behaviour differs according to the tenure regime and land rights. Third, by using our field survey data, this paper identifies the links between specific land rights, instead of just the land tenure type, and investment incentives. The paper also measures the size of efficiency loss from the current land rights arrangements.

JEL Classification: Q15

Suggested Citation

Li, Guo and Rozelle, Scott and Huang, Jikun, Land Rights, Farmer Investment Incentives, and Agricultural Production in China (December 2000). Dept. of Agricultural & Resource Econ. Univ. of California, Davis Working Paper No. 00-024. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=321740 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.321740

Guo Li

World Bank - Rural Development (EASRD) ( email )

Washington, DC 20433
United States

Scott Rozelle (Contact Author)

University of California, Davis - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics ( email )

One Shields Avenue
Davis, CA 95616
United States
530-752-9897 (Phone)

Jikun Huang

Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) ( email )

Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP)
No. Jia 11, Datun Road
Anwai, Beijing, 100101
China
+86 10 64889440 (Phone)
+86 10 64856533 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ccap.org.cn/english/ccapstaff.asp?PID=1380

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