Institutionalization, Delegation, and Asset Prices
69 Pages Posted: 8 Aug 2018 Last revised: 5 Feb 2020
Date Written: April 1, 2019
We study the effects of institutionalization on fund manager compensation and asset prices. Institutionalization raises the performance-sensitive component of the equilibrium contract, which makes institutional investors effectively more risk averse. Institutionalization affects market outcomes through two opposing effects. The direct effect is to bring in more informed capital, and the indirect effect is to make each institutional investor trade less aggressively on information through affecting the equilibrium contract. When there are many institutions and little noise trading in the market, the indirect contracting effect dominates the direct informed capital effect in determining market variables such as the cost of capital, return volatility, price volatility, and market liquidity. Otherwise, the direct informed capital effect dominates.
Keywords: Institutionalization; delegation; information acquisition; agency problem; asset prices
JEL Classification: G11, G14
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation