Using Experimental Evidence to Design Optimal Notice and Takedown Process

19 Pages Posted: 8 Aug 2018 Last revised: 17 Oct 2018

See all articles by Lenka Fiala

Lenka Fiala

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Martin Husovec

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Tilburg University - Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society (TILT); Stanford University - Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society

Date Written: July 23, 2018

Abstract

Whether it is copyright infringement or hate speech, Internet intermediaries like Facebook, Twitter or YouTube are expected to enforce the law by removing illegal content. The legal scheme under which a lot of such delegated enforcement takes place is often referred to as notice & takedown. According to theory and empirical evidence, this scheme leads to many false positives due to over-notification by concerned parties, over-compliance by providers, and under-assertion of rights by affected content creators. We re-create these problems in a laboratory and then test a mechanism to address two of them: the over-compliance by providers, and the lack of complaints by the content creators. We show that our proposed solution of an independent ADR mechanism significantly reduces over-compliance by providers. At the same time, it increases complaints by the content creators who are successful in their complaints, but primarily in cases in which it is easier to evaluate who is right.

Keywords: experiment, notice and take-down, counter-notice, online enforcement, copyright, hate speech

JEL Classification: C91, D02, K24, K42

Suggested Citation

Fiala, Lenka and Husovec, Martin, Using Experimental Evidence to Design Optimal Notice and Takedown Process (July 23, 2018). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2018-028. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3218286 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3218286

Lenka Fiala

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Martin Husovec (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society (TILT) ( email )

P.O.Box 90153
Prof. Cobbenhagenlaan 221
Tilburg, 5037
Netherlands

Stanford University - Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

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