Complexity in Loan Contracts

58 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2018 Last revised: 9 May 2022

See all articles by Victoria Ivashina

Victoria Ivashina

Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Boris Vallee

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 6, 2022

Abstract

Using novel data on 1,240 credit agreements from the leveraged loan market, we propose simple measures of contractual complexity based on clauses qualifying negative covenants. We document a high average level of contractual complexity and significant heterogeneity. Sophisticated borrowers, and larger non-bank funding of a loan, are associated with more complex contractual terms. The 2017 J.Crew debt restructuring, a high-profile case involving a complex contract, corresponds to a market-wide value transfer from lenders to equity holders for borrowers with complex loan contracts. Contractual complexity in lending thus appears to have important economic implications consistent with weaker control rights for lenders.

Keywords: Leveraged Loans; Loan contracts; Covenants; Carve-out; Basket; Creditor Governance; LBO

JEL Classification: G14, G23, G32

Suggested Citation

Ivashina, Victoria and Vallee, Boris, Complexity in Loan Contracts (May 6, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3218631 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3218631

Victoria Ivashina

Harvard University ( email )

Harvard Business School
Baker Library 233
Boston, MA 02163
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Boris Vallee (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States

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