Regionalism and Tribal Insecurity in India

85 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2018 Last revised: 8 Apr 2021

See all articles by Sacha Kapoor

Sacha Kapoor

Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam

Arvind Magesan

University of Calgary

Date Written: March 21, 2021

Abstract

Observers have long been ambivalent about democratic representation by parties with a regionalist orientation. We estimate the causal effect of regionalist party representation on political violence in India and find regionalist parties who win power cause local violence, but not through increased conflict with the Center. Rather, successful regionalists tend to favor local ethnic majorities, causing heightened uncertainty for local minority groups. In particular, we show that the increased violence is explained entirely by electoral constituencies with significant tribal populations but no mandated political representation for tribes, and that regionalist parties further decrease local tribal persons' reported consumption of television and radio, cultural goods, and wages. Our results imply representation by local majorities further relegates local tribal minorities to the margins of society, and that they in turn respond with organized political violence.

Keywords: Regionalism, Political Violence, Civil Conflict, Elections, Tribal Populations.

JEL Classification: D74, H19, H77, P48

Suggested Citation

Kapoor, Sacha and Magesan, Arvind, Regionalism and Tribal Insecurity in India (March 21, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3219978 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3219978

Sacha Kapoor

Erasmus University Rotterdam ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://people.few.eur.nl

Erasmus University Rotterdam ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://people.few.eur.nl

Arvind Magesan (Contact Author)

University of Calgary ( email )

2500 University DR NW
Calgary, AB
Canada

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