Drug Injury Advertising

47 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2018 Last revised: 22 Nov 2018

See all articles by Jesse King

Jesse King

Weber State University

Elizabeth Chika Tippett

University of Oregon School of Law

Date Written: July 25, 2018


Drug injury advertising, which solicits consumers for lawsuits against drug and medical device manufacturers, is a $114 million business. Yet little is known about how consumers respond to the medical information contained in those ads. This research applies insights from the field of marketing to the drug injury advertising context and further tests those insights through two experiments. Results suggest that some consumers are deceived by drug injury ads and that some types of advertising are more deceptive than others. We also find that deceptive drug injury ads have a stronger influence on consumer risk perceptions and behavioral intentions. These effects can be mitigated through educational interventions or competing advertisements promoting the drug. Additionally, we find some evidence of a “spillover effect,” where unaffected groups nevertheless perceive increased risk. We situate this research within the factual and legal background for drug injury advertising, as well as the extant scientific literature. We conclude with a discussion of the regulatory implications of the study.

Keywords: Attorney Advertising, Legal Advertising, Marketing, Torts, Drug Injury, Mass Torts, Pharmaceutical, Prescription Drugs, Drugs, Legal Profession

Suggested Citation

King, Jesse and Tippett, Elizabeth Chika, Drug Injury Advertising (July 25, 2018). Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3220066

Jesse King

Weber State University ( email )

3802 University Circle
Ogden, UT 84408
United States

Elizabeth Chika Tippett (Contact Author)

University of Oregon School of Law ( email )

1515 Agate Street
Eugene, OR Oregon 97403
United States
541-346-8938 (Phone)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics