Multi-Agent Information Acquisition and Sharing

55 Pages Posted: 14 Aug 2018

Date Written: July 28, 2018

Abstract

How should a manager optimally choose transfers to incentivize multiple agents both to collect and to share costly information? To answer this question we study a simple model with a principal and two agents. The agents can obtain costly signals and communicate with each another via non-verifiable messages (cheap talk). A principal offers a contract which is separable in the performances of the agents. We characterize the optimal transfers and show a surprising result that for sufficiently correlated information and not too high costs of information acquisition an agent's optimal transfer should depend mainly on the performance of the other agent.

Keywords: Contracts, Organizations, Information Acquisition, Cheap Talk

JEL Classification: D82, M52

Suggested Citation

Migrow, Dimitri and Squintani, Francesco, Multi-Agent Information Acquisition and Sharing (July 28, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3221771 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3221771

Francesco Squintani

University of Warwick ( email )

Gibbet Hill Rd.
Coventry, West Midlands CV4 8UW
United Kingdom

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