The Neoliberal Turn in Environmental Regulation

40 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2018

Date Written: 2016


Regulation has taken a neoliberal turn, using market-based mechanisms to achieve social benefits, especially in the context of environmental protection, and promoting information dissemination, labeling, and advertising to influence consumer preferences. Although this turn to neoliberal environmental regulation is well under way, there have been few attempts to manage this new reality. Instead, most commentators simply applaud or criticize the turn. If relying on neoliberal environmental reform (i.e., facing this reality regardless of one’s view of this turn), regulation and checks on these reforms are required. This Article argues that in light of the shift from traditional to neoliberal “substantive” environmental regulation, “procedural” checks are required through regulation and legislation to improve the quality of the market-based and informational neoliberal approaches, including oversight via regulation that ensures accuracy in valuation of natural resources, increases and improves the quality of the information provided by consumers, and requires greater accountability and accuracy from institutions making green claims to consumers.

Keywords: social benefits, neoliberal, neoliberal environmental regulation, environmental regulation, laissez faire, agency, agency standards, environmental legislation, american environmental regulation, market, market mechanisms, market mechanisms environmental regulations, information labeling

JEL Classification: D11, K10, K19, K32, Q5,

Suggested Citation

Czarnezki, Jason J. and Fiedler, Katherine, The Neoliberal Turn in Environmental Regulation (2016). Utah Law Review, Vol. 2016, No. 1, 2016, Available at SSRN:

Jason J. Czarnezki (Contact Author)

Pace University - School of Law ( email )

78 North Broadway
White Plains, NY 10603
United States

Katherine Fiedler

Pace University

One Pace Plaza
White Plains, NY New York 10603
United States

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