Markets for Rules: The Promise and Peril of Blockchain Distributed Governance

Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Forthcoming

23 Pages Posted: 15 Aug 2018 Last revised: 18 Aug 2019

See all articles by Nick Cowen

Nick Cowen

School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lincoln; New York University School of Law

Date Written: August 18, 2019

Abstract

Purpose: Explore the possible contributions of blockchain technology to creating new governance structures that facilitate social cooperation.

Methodology: Conceptual analysis with key ideas in new institutional economics and political theory.

Findings: Blockchain technology provides a new tool through which political entrepreneurs can credibly alienate some of their power within a system of rules that they have established.

Originality: Links discussion of blockchain entrepreneurship in commercial markets to research into private governance and political thought.

Keywords: Hayek, Buchanan, blockchain, cryptocurrency, bitcoin, private governance, new institutional economics

JEL Classification: B52, B53

Suggested Citation

Cowen, Nick, Markets for Rules: The Promise and Peril of Blockchain Distributed Governance (August 18, 2019). Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3223728 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3223728

Nick Cowen (Contact Author)

School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lincoln ( email )

Lincoln LN2
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://ulincoln.academia.edu/NickCowen

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.nyu.edu/

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