Markets for Rules: The Promise and Peril of Blockchain Distributed Governance

13 Pages Posted: 15 Aug 2018  

Nick Cowen

New York University School of Law

Date Written: July 31, 2018

Abstract

Classical liberals seek the paradoxical: government powerful enough to protect individuals from preying off each other, but limited enough to prevent it becoming a fierce predator itself. The emergence of blockchain technology heralds a potential revolution in our collective capacity to implement limited government. Blockchains offer a more secure and transparent way of implementing rules while permitting individual choice between rulesets that can co-exist at the same time and place. What this could ultimately mean is that a great deal of what we have traditionally conceived to be governance might be disintermediated from the territorially defined monopolistic coercive authorities that classically define states.

Keywords: Hayek, Buchanan, blockchain, cryptocurrency, bitcoin, private governance, new institutional economics

JEL Classification: B52, B53

Suggested Citation

Cowen, Nick, Markets for Rules: The Promise and Peril of Blockchain Distributed Governance (July 31, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3223728

Nick Cowen (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.nyu.edu/

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
24
Abstract Views
90
PlumX