Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago

14 Pages Posted: 15 Aug 2018

See all articles by Battal Doğan

Battal Doğan

Department of Economics, University of Bristol

M. Bumin Yenmez

Boston College

Date Written: June 18, 2018

Abstract

The Chicago Board of Education is implementing a centralized clearinghouse to assign students to schools for 2018-19 admissions. In this clearinghouse, each student can simultaneously be admitted to a selective and a nonselective school. We study this divided enrollment system and show that an alternative unified enrollment system, which elicits the preferences of students over all schools and assigns each student to only one school, is better for students when choice rules of schools are substitutable. Furthermore, we characterize the sources of inefficiency in the divided system.

Keywords: Market design, school choice, unified enrollment.

Suggested Citation

Doğan, Battal and Yenmez, M. Bumin, Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago (June 18, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3223791 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3223791

Battal Doğan (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, University of Bristol ( email )

United Kingdom

M. Bumin Yenmez

Boston College ( email )

140 Commonwealth Ave.
Maloney Hall 327
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

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