Bayesian Comparative Statics

37 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2018 Last revised: 26 May 2021

See all articles by Teddy Mekonnen

Teddy Mekonnen

Brown University

René Leal Vizcaíno

Northwestern University, Department of Economics; Banco de Mexico

Date Written: August 6, 2018


We study how changes to the informativeness of signals in Bayesian games and single-agent decision problems affect the distribution of equilibrium actions. Focusing on supermodular environments, we provide conditions under which a more precise private signal for one agent leads to an increasing-mean spread or a decreasing-mean spread of equilibrium actions for all agents. We apply our comparative statics to information disclosure games between a sender and many receivers and derive sufficient conditions on the primitive payoffs that lead to extremal disclosure of information.

Keywords: Comparative statics, supermodular order, convex order, information disclosure

JEL Classification: C44, C61, D42, D81

Suggested Citation

Mekonnen, Teddy and Leal Vizcaíno, René, Bayesian Comparative Statics (August 6, 2018). Available at SSRN: or

Teddy Mekonnen (Contact Author)

Brown University ( email )

64 Waterman St
Providence, RI 02912-9029
United States


René Leal Vizcaíno

Northwestern University, Department of Economics ( email )

Evanston, IL
United States

Banco de Mexico ( email )

Ave Cinco e Mayo 1
Col. Centro
Mexico City, Mexico DF 06059

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