Deception in Management Accounting Experimental Research: 'A Tricky Issue' Revisited

Abstract

Management accounting scholars generally accept the proposition that our subject matter requires a multi-disciplinary approach to study. One research methods issue that has become more controversial in recent years is the appropriateness of the experimenter deceiving experimental participants. Broadly speaking there are two main perspectives from different base disciplines about experimental deception: “deception if necessary” (social psychology) and “deception should be banned” (experimental economics). Our goal is to develop a common understanding within the management accounting research community about what constitutes deceptive research practices. We review the viewpoints and arguments supporting the two main views and analyze the transfer of their norms into management accounting research. We develop a framework that evaluates the need for and potential consequences of using deception. Our analysis implies the need for careful researchers consideration ex-ante of the decision to employ deception and case-by-case editorial review of experiments employing deception in light of the considerations raised in this article. In the long run, we suggest that the management accounting research community consider if an explicit policy statement on the role of deception in management accounting research is warranted or whether a case-by-case approach as advocated by us as an interim measure is sufficient.

Keywords: Deception in Research, Debriefing, Human Participant Research, Management Accounting, Experiments, Experimental Economics

JEL Classification: M41