Primary Care Competition and Quality of Care: Empirical Evidence from Medicare

29 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2018 Last revised: 26 May 2020

See all articles by Christopher Brunt

Christopher Brunt

Georgia Southern University - Department of Economics

Joshua R. Hendrickson

University of Mississippi

John R. Bowblis

Miami University of Ohio - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 13, 2019

Abstract

In this paper, we explore the effects of primary care physician (PCP) practice competition on five distinct quality metrics directly tied to screening, follow-up care, and prescribing behavior under Medicare Part B. Controlling for physician, practice, and area characteristics as well as zip code fixed effects, we find strong evidence that PCP practices in more concentrated areas provide lower quality of care. More specifically, PCPs in more concentrated areas are less likely to perform screening and follow-up care for high blood pressure, unhealthy bodyweight, and tobacco use. They are also less likely to document current medications. Furthermore, PCPs in more concentrated areas have a higher amount of opioid prescriptions as a fraction of total prescriptions.

Keywords: Primary Care Competition, Quality, Medicare Part B

JEL Classification: I11, L11

Suggested Citation

Brunt, Christopher and Hendrickson, Joshua R. and Bowblis, John R., Primary Care Competition and Quality of Care: Empirical Evidence from Medicare (June 13, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3229955 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3229955

Christopher Brunt

Georgia Southern University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 8153
Statesboro, GA 30458
United States

Joshua R. Hendrickson (Contact Author)

University of Mississippi ( email )

Oxford, MS 38677
United States

John R. Bowblis

Miami University of Ohio - Department of Economics ( email )

800 E. High St.
Farmer School of Business, 2054
Oxford, OH 45056
United States

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