Shareholder Voting on Golden Parachutes
38 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2018 Last revised: 23 Oct 2018
Date Written: October 21, 2018
With the passage of Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, Congress attempted to constrain executive compensation triggered by change-in-control (golden parachute) payments by giving shareholders the right to approve or disapprove the payments on an advisory basis. This Article is the first to empirically examine the experience with the Say-on-Golden-Parachute (“SOGP”) vote. We find that the SOGP voting regime is likely ineffective in controlling GP compensation. First, proxy advisors appear more likely to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to recommendations on SOGP votes. Second, shareholders appear seem more likely to adhere to advisor recommendations. Finally, golden parachutes appear to be increasing in years following SOGP and that golden parachutes that are amended immediately prior to an SOGP vote tend to grow rather than shrink. These findings contrast with the research that have examined Say-on-Pay, and we suggest that the differences between the two regimes lie in the absence of second-stage discipline for SOGP votes. We offer potential avenues for improving SOGP’s ability to shape change-in-control compensation practices, such as making SOGP votes binding, and making the GP payment and SOGP voting information more readily available to shareholders of corporations where the target directors also serve as directors and also of acquiring corporations.
Keywords: Golden Parachutes, Executive Compensation, Shareholder Voting, Say on Golden Parachutes, Corporate Governance
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