Committee Election and Rotation

25 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2018

See all articles by Daniel J. Smith

Daniel J. Smith

Middle Tennessee State University - Department of Economics and Finance

Date Written: August 14, 2018

Abstract

Can committee election and rotation (CER) for public office supplement formal terms and term limits to achieve more frequent office rotation without incurring, to the same extent, the associated turnover costs of a term limit set to the equivalent length? This paper provides a theoretical description of CER where two or more individuals are elected to serve individual terms for the same public office, with the exclusive right to exercise the public office rotating amongst the committee members at intervals shorter than the term length. CER would be most likely to emerge among a factional electorate, as CER would enable shorter rotations in office. A case study of three high-level public offices using CER in the Republic of Venice, controlled by factional patricians, provides evidence of the historical structure and operation of CER. The tripartite presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is examined as a modern day application of CER among a factional electorate.

Keywords: Public Choice; Term Limits; Venice; Economic History

JEL Classification: D7; H1

Suggested Citation

Smith, Daniel J., Committee Election and Rotation (August 14, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3230755 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3230755

Daniel J. Smith (Contact Author)

Middle Tennessee State University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

MTSU Box 27
1301 E. Main St.
Murfreesboro, TN 37132-0001
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.danieljosephsmith.com/

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