Turn-taking in Office
Constitutional Political Economy, Forthcoming
28 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2018 Last revised: 9 Apr 2020
Date Written: December 19, 2018
This paper provides a theoretical description for the adoption of turn-taking in office where two or more individuals are elected to a committee to serve individual terms for the same public office, with the exclusive right to exercise the public office rotating, exclusively, among the members of the committee at intervals shorter than the term length. Turn-taking would enable the benefits of shorter tenures to be realized without incurring, to the same extent, the costs associated with setting an equivalently shortened term and term limit regime. Turn-taking would be most likely to emerge among a factional electorate to increase rotation in office to generate support for shared governance institutions. A case study of three high-level public offices in the Republic of Venice, controlled by factional patricians, provides evidence of the emergence and operation of turn-taking. The tripartite presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is examined as a modern day application of turn-taking emerging among a factional electorate.
Keywords: Public Choice; Term Limits; Venice; Economic History
JEL Classification: D7; H1
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation