Can Groups Be Trusted? An Experimental Study of Collective Trust

Carnegie Mellon Behavioral Decision Research Working Paper No. 308

28 Pages Posted: 6 Nov 2002

See all articles by Bill McEvily

Bill McEvily

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Roberto A. Weber

University of Zurich - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Cristina Bicchieri

University of Pennsylvania

Violet Ho

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: July 10, 2002

Abstract

Several previous studies measure the extent to which individuals trust other individuals and argue that individual trust is an important element of interaction in organizations and markets. However, a related topic is the extent to which it is possible for individuals to trust groups as separate entities. This concept, referred to as collective trust, has been previously discussed but not carefully demonstrated. We conduct experiments that specifically address the question of whether it is possible for individuals to exhibit trust for a group, beyond the trust they exhibit for individual members of that group. Using the trust (or investment) game, our results show that individuals exhibit collective trust: They transfer perceptions of trustworthiness to individuals based on previous experiences with members of that individual's group, even with a very minimal form of group membership.

Keywords: trust, group identity

JEL Classification: C92, D23

Suggested Citation

McEvily, William J. and Weber, Roberto A. and Bicchieri, Cristina and Ho, Violet, Can Groups Be Trusted? An Experimental Study of Collective Trust (July 10, 2002). Carnegie Mellon Behavioral Decision Research Working Paper No. 308, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=323223 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.323223

William J. McEvily

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada

Roberto A. Weber (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Cristina Bicchieri

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-5820 (Phone)

Violet Ho

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

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