Subjective Evaluations of Risk Taking Decisions: Experimental Evidence on Outcome Biases and Their Consequences

Abstract

This study experimentally investigates how a principal uses outcome information in her subjective evaluation of an agent who chooses between alternatives of differing risks, and how outcome bias in the evaluation is related to the agent’s risk taking decision. We consider both a situation of information symmetry, where the principal can observe the agent’s decision, and a situation of information asymmetry, where the agent’s decision is hidden. Within both situations, we compare a condition where the principal receives peer comparison information with a condition where such information is unavailable. We hypothesize and find that principals’ evaluations are subject to an outcome bias, and that the bias is stronger when peer comparison is present. We further hypothesize and find that with peer comparison being present, agents’ decisions become increasingly misaligned with principals’ preferences. Our findings contribute to understanding outcome biases in subjective evaluations of risk taking decisions, and how these biases may contribute to explaining excessive risk taking by agents.

Keywords: subjective performance evaluation, outcome bias, risk taking, peer comparison

JEL Classification: M41, M52