Demand-driven Feedback Systems, Recordkeeping and Easy Task Prioritization

43 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2018 Last revised: 4 Sep 2020

See all articles by Farah Arshad

Farah Arshad

The University of Manchester

Bart Dierynck

Tilburg University

Date Written: August 17, 2018

Abstract

With the emergence of new technologies, the use of demand-driven feedback systems where employees have a choice over whether and how frequently they want to get feedback is increasing. In this study, we experimentally examine individuals’ tendency to choose easier tasks over difficult tasks (labelled as easy task prioritization) as an unintended consequence of demand-driven feedback systems. We find that demand-driven feedback systems lead to a higher easy task prioritization and that recordkeeping can reduce the easy task prioritization induced by demand-driven feedback systems. In an extension of the main experiment, we examine whether easy task prioritization can be reduced by further modifications to demand-driven feedback systems, i.e. when employees can plan what tasks to do (planning) and the system suggests the next task based on the plan (dynamic sequencing). However, these modifications do not have an incremental effect over recordkeeping in reducing the easy task prioritization. Our study uncovers how modern accounting systems influence task selection and tests how demand-driven feedback systems could be modified to mitigate the unintended consequences of demand-driven feedback systems.

Keywords: Demand-driven feedback systems, Recordkeeping, Easy task prioritization

JEL Classification: M40, M41, M11

Suggested Citation

Arshad, Farah and Dierynck, Bart, Demand-driven Feedback Systems, Recordkeeping and Easy Task Prioritization (August 17, 2018). AAA 2019 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233517 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3233517

Farah Arshad

The University of Manchester ( email )

Oxford Road
Manchester, M13 9PL
United Kingdom

Bart Dierynck (Contact Author)

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC Noord-Brabant 5000 LE
Netherlands

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