Voluntary Disclosure Fostering Overenforcement and Overcriminalization of the FCPA

67 Florida Law Review Forum 289 (2016)

9 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2018

See all articles by Karen E. Woody

Karen E. Woody

Washington & Lee University School of Law

Date Written: February 17, 2016

Abstract

Professor Peter Reilly’s article challenges the notion that voluntary disclosure of potential Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations to the government is always the best course of action for a company. In a world where whistleblowers can receive a bounty for information provided to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),self-reporting is a critical, high-pressure decision that each company must undertake when faced with potential FCPA liability. This Article takes a broader look at the FCPA landscape, focusing on SEC enforcement, in parallel to the Department of Justice (DOJ) focus that Professor Reilly undertakes in his Article. Specifically, this Article buttresses Professor Reilly’s argument by pointing out that the SEC has become an increasingly prosecutorial agency that uses disgorgement as a punitive measure, and enjoys the ability to be both prosecutor and judge in a settlement-driven landscape. In practicality, this means the scales are tipped in the government’s favor, making the decision whether to voluntarily disclose even murkier.

Keywords: FCPA, compliance, criminalization, DOJ

Suggested Citation

Woody, Karen E., Voluntary Disclosure Fostering Overenforcement and Overcriminalization of the FCPA (February 17, 2016). 67 Florida Law Review Forum 289 (2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233712

Karen E. Woody (Contact Author)

Washington & Lee University School of Law ( email )

Lexington, VA 24450
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
12
Abstract Views
119
PlumX Metrics