Why do firms disclose a Supplementary CEO-employee Pay Ratio? Initial evidence from Dodd-Frank Act Section 953 (b)

52 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2018 Last revised: 3 Dec 2018

See all articles by Sun Moon Jung

Sun Moon Jung

Seoul National University

Natalie Kyung Won Kim

Seoul National University - College of Business Administration

Han Seong Ryu

Seoul National University

Jae Yong Shin

Seoul National University - College of Business Administration

Date Written: August 18, 2018

Abstract

Section 953 (b) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires all listed firms to disclose a CEO-employee Pay Ratio. Firms are permitted certain discretions in the Pay Ratio calculation and can disclose a Supplementary Pay Ratio if necessary. In this paper, we analyze initial CEO-employee Pay Ratio data disclosed from January to July 2018 by 1,125 firms in the S&P 1500 Index. We examine whether firms disclose a Supplementary Pay Ratio to inform stakeholders of the Pay Ratio more transparently or to manage stakeholder perceptions of the Pay Ratio. We find evidence consistent with both informational and opportunistic motives driving the Supplementary Pay Ratio disclosure. Furthermore, firms appear to consider two different kinds of political costs—the political costs of disclosing a high Pay Ratio and the political costs of disclosing a supplementary “downward” Pay Ratio. Finally, we find that some firms disclose a Supplementary Pay Ratio higher than the Required Pay Ratio to signal the existence of stronger tournament incentives for labor market considerations.

Keywords: CEO-employee Pay Ratio, CEO Pay Ratio, Supplementary Pay Ratio, Pay Ratio Disclosure

Suggested Citation

Jung, Sun Moon and Kim, Natalie Kyung Won and Ryu, Han Seong and Shin, Jae Yong, Why do firms disclose a Supplementary CEO-employee Pay Ratio? Initial evidence from Dodd-Frank Act Section 953 (b) (August 18, 2018). AAA 2019 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3234013 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3234013

Sun Moon Jung

Seoul National University ( email )

Seoul, 151-742
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Natalie Kyung Won Kim (Contact Author)

Seoul National University - College of Business Administration ( email )

Seoul, 151-742
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Han Seong Ryu

Seoul National University ( email )

Kwanak-gu
Seoul, 151-742
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Jae Yong Shin

Seoul National University - College of Business Administration ( email )

Seoul, 151-742
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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