The Political Economy of Reforms in Central Bank Design: Evidence from a New Dataset

48 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2018 Last revised: 24 Sep 2020

See all articles by Davide Romelli

Davide Romelli

Trinity College (Dublin) - Department of Economics; Trinity College (Dublin)

Date Written: August 7, 2020

Abstract

What explains the worldwide changes in central bank design over the past five decades? Using a new dataset on central bank institutional design, this paper investigates the timing, pace and magnitude of reforms in a sample of 155 countries over the period 1972-2017. I construct a new dynamic index of central bank independence and show that status quo, as well as regional convergence, represent important drivers of changes in central bank design. An external pressure, such as obtaining an IMF loan, also impacts the reform process, while political or economic factors have a heterogeneous impact depending on the level of economic development. Reforms also follow periods of high inflation rates, suggesting an endogeneous evolution of central bank independence. The results also reveal important heterogeneities in the reform process depending on the level of development, the size and direction of reforms, as well as the different dimensions along which central bank legislation can be amended.

Keywords: Central banks, central bank independence, central bank governance, legislative reforms

JEL Classification: E58, G28, N20, P16

Suggested Citation

Romelli, Davide, The Political Economy of Reforms in Central Bank Design: Evidence from a New Dataset (August 7, 2020). BAFFI CAREFIN Centre Research Paper No. 2018-87, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3235209 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3235209

Davide Romelli (Contact Author)

Trinity College (Dublin) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Trinity College (Dublin) ( email )

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