Bayesian Persuasion with Private Information

37 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2018

See all articles by Andrew Kosenko

Andrew Kosenko

Department of Economics, Accounting, and Finance, School of Management, Marist College; Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics; Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh

Date Written: February 5, 2018

Abstract

We study a model of communication and Bayesian persuasion between a sender who is privately informed and has state independent preferences, and a receiver who has preferences that depend on the unknown state. In a model with two states of the world, over the interesting range of parameters, the equilibria can be pooling or separating, but a particular novel refinement forces the pooling to be on the most informative information structure in all but one case. We also study two extensions - a model with more information structures as well as a model where the state of the world is non-dichotomous, and show that analogous results emerge.

Keywords: persuasion, communication, information provision, information design

JEL Classification: D82, D83, C72

Suggested Citation

Kosenko, Andrew, Bayesian Persuasion with Private Information (February 5, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3236191 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3236191

Andrew Kosenko (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, Accounting, and Finance, School of Management, Marist College ( email )

3399 North Road
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
United States

Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics ( email )

420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh ( email )

4901 Wesley Posvar Hall
230 South Bouquet Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States

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