Competing Auctions

59 Pages Posted: 15 Aug 2002

See all articles by Drew Fudenberg

Drew Fudenberg

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Glenn Ellison

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: February 7, 2002

Abstract

This paper studies the conditions under which two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium, without the larger one attracting all of the smaller one's patrons. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer-seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially "thin."

Suggested Citation

Fudenberg, Drew and Ellison, Glenn David, Competing Auctions (February 7, 2002). Harvard Institute Research Working Paper No. 1960. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=323740 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.323740

Drew Fudenberg (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

Glenn David Ellison

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

50 Memorial Drive
Room E52-380B
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-8702 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
192
Abstract Views
1,513
rank
157,752
PlumX Metrics