Tax Morale and the Role of Social Norms and Reciprocity. Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment

40 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2018

See all articles by Philipp Dörrenberg

Philipp Dörrenberg

University of Mannheim; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Andreas Peichl

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 16, 2018

Abstract

We present the first randomized survey experiment in the context of tax compliance to assess the role of social norms and reciprocity for intrinsic tax morale. We find that participants in a social-norm treatment have lower tax morale relative to a control group while participants in a reciprocity treatment have significantly higher tax morale than those in the social-norm group. This suggests that a potential backfire effect of social norms is outweighed if the consequences of violating the social norm are made salient. We further document the anatomy of intrinsic motivations for tax compliance and present first evidence that previously found gender effects in tax morale are not driven by differences in risk preferences.

Keywords: tax compliance, tax evasion, intrinsic motivations, tax morale, social norms, reciprocity

JEL Classification: H200, H320, H500, C930

Suggested Citation

Dörrenberg, Philipp and Peichl, Andreas, Tax Morale and the Role of Social Norms and Reciprocity. Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment (July 16, 2018). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 7149, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3237993

Philipp Dörrenberg

University of Mannheim ( email )

L 7, 3-5
Mannheim, 68161
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Munich
Germany

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Andreas Peichl (Contact Author)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
129
Abstract Views
564
rank
170,558
PlumX Metrics